A large body of literature suggests individuals behave differently when responding to hypothetical valuation questions than when actual payment is required. Such findings have generated a great deal of skepticism over the use of the contingent valuation method and benefit measures derived from it. Recently, a new method, cheap talk, has been proposed to eliminate the potential bias in hypothetical valuation questions. Cheap talk refers to process of explaining hypothetical bias to individuals prior to asking a valuation question. This study explores the effect of cheap talk in a mass mail survey using a conventional value elicitation technique.
I would like to thank Jason Shogren and Sean Fox for helpful comments on an earlier draft of the paper. Discussions with John List and Darren Hudson also improved the quality of the manuscript.
This research was partially funded by USDA/ARS Grant # 58-6402-9-008 S
Introduction
In recent years, agribusinesses have become interested in producing and selling differentiated agricultural commodities. Estimates of consumer willingness-to-pay for new valued added traits are becoming important determinants of new product adoption. A number of methods have been employed to estimate demand for these quality improvements, including the contingent valuation (CV) method. Despite its popularity in valuing food quality attributes and environmental amenities, CV has been criticized for a variety of reasons (e.g., Diamond and Hausman).
Among the staunchest criticisms of CV is the fact that people tend to overstate the amount they are willing-to-pay for improvements in a public good or an increases in quality of a private good. Evidence of this "hypothetical bias" is widespread (Cummings, Harrison, and Rutström; List and Gallet; Loomis et al., 1997; Neill et al.) . 1 To counter such problems, some research has begun to investigate means of calibrating hypothetical willingness-to-pay to nonhypothetical obtained in an experimental setting (Blackburn, Harrison, and Rutström; Fox et al.; List, Margolis, and Shogren; List and Shogren) . Although such research has been useful for exploring the nature of hypothetical bias, applications are often limited to private goods, for which actual values can be estimated in a market-based experiment. Further, results from previous research imply that calibration factors vary on a case-by-case basis. Because calibration provides an ex post correction of hypothetical bias, a specific calibration factor must be determined for each study.
Cummings and Taylor introduced an alternative and more straightforward method of eliminating hypothetical bias in public good valuation. They employed a cheap talk script, which simply explained the problem of hypothetical bias to study participants prior to administration of a valuation question. Cheap talk has been described in game theoretic literature as non-binding communication between two players in a game. In this regard, cheap talk can be thought of as non-binding communication between a researcher and survey respondent prior to elicitation of a hypothetical willingness-to-pay question. Using cheap talk to eliminate hypothetical bias is perhaps more general than calibration because it provides an ex ante bias correction that can be applied in any valuation task.
The results of previous literature are clear: cheap talk effectively removes hypothetical bias for consumers relatively unknowledgeable of the good evaluated. Cummings and Taylor found that cheap talk was effective at remo ving hypothetical bias in several public good valuations and List (2001a) found that cheap talk eliminated hypothetical bias with private goods in a field experiment. Utilizing cheap talk to reduce or eliminate hypothetical bias in non-market valuation provides the potential to overcome one of CV's greatest obstacles.
However, to date cheap talk studies have been limited to either a laboratory or closely controlled field setting. 2 Although laboratory or field experiments are extremely useful for testing behavioral hypotheses, they are often limited by small sample sizes and carry the potential for sample selection bias. Cheap talk will be more valuable to practitioners if its ability to mitigate hypothetical bias extends to large-scale applications such as mass mail or phone surveys. To that end, the goal of this paper is to explore the effect of cheap talk on willingnessto-pay elicited via mass mail survey (n = 4,900) for a novel food product: "golden" rice. We also expand on previous literature by analyzing cheap talk in the context of a traditional CV elicitation technique. Employing a double bounded dichotomous choice question, we find that estimated willingness-to-pay calculated from hypothetical responses with cheap talk are significantly less than willingness-to-pay estimated from hypothetical responses without cheap talk. However, consistent with List (2001a) , we find that cheap talk does not reduce willingnessto-pay for experienced, or in our case knowledgeable, consumers. For both classes of consumers, average willingness-to-pay for golden rice exceeds the price of traditional white rice.
Review of Cheap Talk Literature
Cummings and Taylor were the first to report on the potential of cheap talk to reduce or eliminate hypothetical bias with student participants in a laboratory setting. Their cheap talk script contained three primary sections with: a) an explanation of hypothetical bias, b) a discussion of why hypothetical bias might exist, and c) a request to avoid hypothetical bias in a subsequent valuation question. In their experiments, participants voted by referenda on contribution to a public good. Four different public goods were utilized in the experimental design and various subjects participated in real, hypothetical, and hypothetical with cheap talk referenda. The public goods varied by what was being delivered, where delivery was taking place, and the degree of the good delivered in relation the amount of the contribution. They also examined variations in cheap talk script.
The results of Cummings and Taylor's experiments can be summarized as follows: a) hypothetical valuations without cheap talk were typically greater than when real payment was required, b) hypothetical valuations with cheap talk were equal to real valuations in every treatment, and c) cheap talk did not introduce a downward bias in valuations that was coincidentally equal to hypothetical bias as evidenced by the fact that cheap talk did not decrease valuations when hypothetical, non-cheap talk valuations were already equivalent to real valuations. That is, cheap talk lowered willingness-to-pay when the propensity for hypothetical bias existed and will left willingness-to-pay unaffected in cases where hypothetical bias didn't exist. Results were robust across all referenda and variations in the cheap talk script.
In a follow-up study, List (2001a) List (2001a) concluded that experienced subjects might have been be less susceptible to the external prompting of a cheap talk script because they had developed hard-andfast rules and valuation strategies which were not easily changed. Additionally, experienced card traders may have believed they were very familiar with market conditions and therefore discounted the cheap talk information. This finding presents a challenge to the future use of cheap talk. If cheap talk does not reduce hypothetical bias for experienced consumers, then estimating demand for this important market segment becomes more complex.
Despite the previous finding, however, List (2001b) found that real and hypothetical with cheap talk responses were equivalent for experience and inexperienced card traders, when using an alternative payment vehicle. Employing a choice experiment (where subjects make repeated choices between two or more alternatives described by varying attributes), cheap talk induced experienced participants to avoid hypothetical bias. When the elicitation question was framed in a manner more consistent with routine behavior (i.e., making a choice versus bidding in an auction), experienced subjects were apparently more open to accepting the cheap talk information. List (2001b) Further, in experimental settings cheap talk appears to be effective for all cases except those involving experienced subjects. Yet there appears to be some interaction between experience and payment vehicle with regard to cheap talk effectiveness. In sum, there are a number of unresolved issues regarding the effect of cheap talk on valuations. This study builds on previous research by analyzing the effectiveness of cheap talk using a popular elicitation mechanism: the double bounded dichotomous choice method. To shed light on some of the ongoing debates about cheap talk, we also studied the effect of cheap talk in a mass mail survey and investigate the interaction of cheap talk and subjective knowledge level of the respondent.
Golden Rice
To determine the effect of cheap talk on willingness-to-pay, we constructed a survey to estimate demand for a novel genetically enhanced food. Through advancements in biotechnology and genetic engineering, scientists have recently developed a brand of rice called "golden" rice. By introducing a daffodil gene into traditional rice seeds, scientists have engineered golden rice to contain beta-carotene, which the body converts to vitamin A. Golden rice gets its name from the pale yellow core at the center of each grain, which results from the introduction of the daffodil gene.
Golden rice was chosen as the product of analysis for a number of reasons. First, agribusiness firms have shifted public relation campaigns and research and development efforts toward promoting genetically engineered foods that have benefits for the consumer rather than the producer. Despite the widely held view that consumers will be accepting of genetically engineered foods that have been designed to have a benefit for them, little quantitative research has confirmed this hypothesis. This analysis represents an initial attempt to address this issue.
Second, golden rice is an actual food created through genetic engineering -i.e., it is not contrived. Other foods with enhanced end-use benefits might be imagined, but few have actually been developed. Third, consumer demand for golden rice is unknown (both domestically and abroad). Because golden rice has yet to be introduced into the marketplace it is currently a nonmarket good that provides a useful application in which to investigate the effect of cheap talk.
Because golden rice is a genetically engineered food, uncertainty exists regarding its future success in the marketplace. To date, most of the biotechnology industry's promotion of golden rice has focused on the potential benefits to consumers in third world countries whose diets mainly consist of rice. However, a market may also exist in well-developed countries such as the United States (U.S.). Vitamin A is an essential nutrient in the body and it plays a role in body functions such as vision, immune defense, maintenance of body linings and skin, bone and body growth, normal cell development, and reproduction. Vitamin A deficiency can cause blindness, sickness, and in severe cases death. Because of these benefits, consumers may place value in the enhanced nutrition of the novel food. Furthermore, consumers in the U.S. may value golden rice above traditional rice due to altruistic feelings toward those with poor diets. Golden rice may also be preferred to traditional rice because of the novelty of the good, which has been shown to influence purchasing behavior (Shogren, List, and Hayes) . In contrast, concerns for genetic engineering may outweigh the positive end-use benefit. Whether golden rice will be successful in the U.S. marketplace is an empirical question, which can be addressed by a CV study. To our knowledge, no previous study has estimated demand for golden rice in the U.S.
A few studies have examined consumer preferences for genetically modified foods with enhanced end-use benefits. Lusk et al. (2002a) found that subjects were willing to pay premiums for chips containing corn genetically modified to increase the food's shelf life as opposed to chips containing corn genetically modified to increase crop yield on the farm. In addition the International Food Information Council (IFIC) found, in a 2001 survey of U.S. consumers, that 58 percent of consumers indicated they would be somewhat or very likely to purchase produce that had been modified by biotechnology to taste better or fresher. They also found that 70 percent of consumers indicated they would be somewhat or very likely to purchase produce that had been modified by biotechnology to require fewer pesticide applications.
Without the benefit of enhanced end-use characteristics, fear or concern over biotechnology likely dominates purchasing behavior. Lusk et al. (2000) , Lusk, Fox, and Roosen, and Noussair, Robin and Ruffieux have found that when no specific benefit is provided to by biotechnology, consumers are willing to pay premiums for non-genetically modified foods. That is, a genetically modified food with no specific benefit to consumers must be sold at a discounted price to non-genetically modified food to induce the "average" consumer into purchasing it. For further information on these and other studies, readers are referred to House et al., who provide an extensive summary of previous research on consumer acceptance of biotechnology and genetically modified foods.
Survey Design
We developed a mail survey to determine the effect of cheap talk on consumer willingness-to-pay for golden rice. Because consumers were likely unknowledgeable of golden rice, a base-line level of knowledge about the good was provided in the survey. In choosing the information source, we attempted to convey information that consumers would likely encounter when making the decision to purchase golden rice, which would come in two primary forms:
information from the firm selling golden rice and information provided in the media. One half of the survey sample was provided a copy of a full-page advertisement placed by the Council for Biotechnology Information in Newsweek magazine, which originally appeared in the June 18, 2001 issue (pg. 31). The advertisement contained a picture of an Asian mother and daughter eating rice with a text box describing golden rice. The remaining survey sample received an informational statement prepared by the author (see appendix A for copies of the two information sources). Responses to the willingness-to-pay questions were similar across information sources. As a result, we pooled data form both informational treatments for the following analysis.
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Following the information sheet, we asked respondents to answer several questions, which elicited demographic information as well as data about the respondents' stated knowledge of golden rice and genetically engineering. Following these questions, one-half of the survey sample was provided a cheap talk script. The script was very similar to the Cummings and Taylor script, but was modified to be consistent with our dichotomous choice question and a retail environment. To illustrate the potential influence of hypothetical bias in such questions, we included statistics reported by Shogren et al. in the cheap talk script. That is, subjects were told that studies have shown that over 80 percent of people said they would buy a particular new food in a hypothetical study, but only 43 percent of people actually bought the item when placed on the shelf. Appendix B contains a copy of the cheap talk script.
Finally, all subjects were asked a double-bounded dichotomous choice willingness-to-pay question (Hanneman, Loomis, and Kanninen). The question was posed as follows:
Imagine you are purchasing rice in your local grocery store. You can chose between two types of rice. One is regular long-grain white rice that has not been genetically engineered. This non-genetically engineered rice does not contain vitamin A. The other rice option is Golden Rice. Golden Rice has been genetically engineered to contain vitamin A. One serving of Golden Rice will satisfy 30% of your daily requirement for vitamin A, as outlined by the FDA. Now, imagine that you are in a grocery store and the price of a 1 lb. bag of regular long-grain white long grain is $P WR . Would you purchase a 1 lb. bag of long grain Golden Rice if it cost $P GR1 ?
If the respondent affirmatively answered the question, they were subsequently asked if they would purchase golden rice at $P GR2a ; where $P GR2a > $P GR1 . Conversely, if the participant responded negatively to the question, they were subsequently asked if they would purchase golden rice at $P GR2b ; where $P GR2b < $P GR1 . If the respondent answered NO to both willingness-to-pay questions, a follow-up question was provided that inquired about the reason for both NO responses. All prices, $P WR , $P GR1 , $P GR2a , and $P GR2b , were systematically varied across surveys. The price for white rice, $P WR , was varied at either $0.75 or $0.65 to be consistent with prices in grocery stores across the surveyed region. Although varying $P WR complicates the design, we felt it was essential to be able to estimate a cross-price effect, which may be important for predicting the profitability of introducing a new product such as golden rice. Because consumers may perceive golden rice to be lower quality than white rice, due to genetic modification, consumers may place lower value on the food. Alternatively, consumers may value golden rice over white rice due to enhanced nutritional value. Thus, prices for golden rice were varied above and below the price for white rice, with a maximum possible price of 
Estimation Procedures
To analyze the CV responses, we estimated an interval-censored model (Cameron, 1988;  Cameron and James). Assume that a consumer has a true willingness-to-pay for golden rice, WTP * , where WTP * = xβ + ε. In this case, x is a vector of explanatory variables, β is a (1)
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The coefficient estimates in (1) can be loosely interpreted as the marginal effect of x i on willingness-to-pay (Cameron 1988 ). In the interval-censored model, mean willingness-to-pay value is: E(WTP) = β x , where x is a vector of the sample averages of the independent variables. If one is only interested in the location and scale of the willingness-to-pay within a sample, equation 1 can be estimated with only a constant as an explanatory variable, which yields the marginal mean and variance of the implicit willingness-to-pay (Cameron and Quiggin) . However, such a procedure does not control for subject-specific characteristics that may affect valuations. Thus, a combined model will be estimated that includes demographic explanatory variables and a dummy variable identifying the cheap talk treatment. Because of the nature of the good in question, factors such as knowledge and consumption habits may also influence valuations and will therefore be incorporated into the estimation.
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Results
In July 2001, 4900 surveys were mailed to a random sample of consumers in the fourth largest rice producing state in the U.S. -Mississippi. Addresses were purchased from a reputable private company, which randomly drew names and addresses from the telephone directory. Four hundred seventy eight surveys were returned because of undeliverable addresses and 632 completed surveys were return resulting in a 14% response rate. To provide a consistent number of observations in the analysis that follows, we removed all partially completed surveys from the data set, which reduced the final number of observations to 574. Our respondents had slightly higher incomes and were more educated than the Mississippi population (U.S. Census Bureau). For example, the average household income in Mississippi in 2000 was $48,803 and 18.6 percent of the state population had received a bachelors degree; whereas, the average yearly household income in our sample was roughly $51,000 and almost 40% had received a bachelors degree. Furthermore, the sample is geographically restricted, including only Mississippi consumers. However, it is important to note that the goal of the study is not to generalize willingness-to-pay for golden rice on a national or global basis. The primary objective of the study is to determine the effect of cheap talk on willingness-to-pay. In this regard, our sample provides a test of the effect of cheap talk on two similar populations in which willingness-to-pay was elicited by mail survey. Furthermore, our survey sample has many advantages over respondent samples used in previous cheap talk studies. For example, our sample represents a much broader range of demographics than the student sample in Cummings and Taylor, contains many more observations than List (2001a) , and is derived from a survey with a higher response rate than the survey in List (2001b) . were given cheap talk information were much more price sensitive than respondents who were not given cheap talk information. Respondents that were not given cheap talk information exhibited rather inelastic demand for golden rice (as expressed in the initial dichotomous choice question), whereas respondents who where presented cheap talk information had relatively elastic demand. represents an economically significant effect. As expected, the price of white rice, a substitute good, was positive and statistically significant. The only other variable significantly related to willingness-to-pay was knowledge, implying that consumers that had no knowledge of genetically modified foods were willing to pay about $0.05/lb more than consumers with at least some knowledge about genetically modified foods. The fact that other demographic variables were insignificant in explaining willingness-to-pay for golden rice is consistent with Hamstra's analysis of European consumers.
Some concerns have been expressed with the double bounded dichotomous choice CV method because of the fact that willingness-to-pay implied from the first dichotomous choice question may be inconsistent with willingness-to-pay implied from the second dichotomous choice question (e.g., Cameron and Quiggin). To determine whether this is a problem for our data, following Cameron and Quiggin, we estimated models using data from the first dichotomous choice question only and then estimated models using data from the second dichotomous choice question. Results suggest that willingness-to-pay was stable across the first and second dichotomous choice questions: mean willingness-to-pay from the first question was application, subjects appear to be responding to both willingness-to-pay questions consistently.
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Because List (2001a) found that cheap talk was ineffective at removing hypothetical bias for experienced and knowledgeable subjects (sports card dealers), we sought to determine if a similar effect was present here. Although none of our consumers could have had any direct experience with golden rice, we segmented our sample by knowledge of golden rice and genetic engineering. As shown in table 1, we created a variable referred to as "Experience" that took the value of one if the subject had heard of golden rice prior to the survey and had at least some knowledge of genetically modified foods and zero otherwise. That is, this group of subjects indicated they had more stated knowledge and information about golden rice specifically and genetically modified foods in general than did the "Inexperienced" group. In this respect, this group is similar to the card dealers in List (2001a) . As shown in 3 , cheap talk appears to have divergent effects on experienced and inexperienced subjects. For inexperienced, unknowledgeable subjects (the majority of the sample), cheap talk drastically reduced average willingness-to-pay (by $0.10/lb). However, for experienced, knowledgeable subjects, cheap actually increased willingness-to-pay, however the result is not statistically significant. Although, the results in table 3 are useful for illustrative purposes, they are anecdotal because they do account for uncontrolled subject-specific effects. Because we did not elicit willingness-to-pay in a non-hypothetical treatment, it is important to note that we cannot conclude that our cheap talk script effectively removed hypothetical bias. Our results imply that cheap talk reduced stated willingness-to-pay for the majority of respondents in our sample. Ideally, one would conduct a treatment where actual payment was required. In this case, as with many environmental valuations, actual payment was not possible. Golden rice has yet to be commercially produced and sufficient physical samples of the product were unavailable.
Results also illustrate the impact that cheap talk might have on product adoption decisions. For example, if traditional white rice is priced at $0.70/lb, estimated average willingness-to-pay for golden rice is about $0.91/lb without cheap talk. In this case, one may surmise that so long as production, marketing, and stocking costs are not $0.21/lb more costly for golden rice than white rice, producers may be able to enhance profitability with this new food product. However, with cheap talk, estimated average willingness-to-pay is only $0.85/lb, which is $0.15/lb above the price of traditional white rice. One can imagine a wide range of conditions in which the profitability estimates, derived from a willingness-to-pay study that includes cheap talk, might invoke an alternative investment decision than the profitability estimates from a willingness-to-pay study with no cheap talk.
Conclusions and Implications
Economists interested in non-market valuation have long been concerned about the fact that people behave differently in hypothetical and non-hypothetical settings. The advent of cheap talk may alleviate this concern for future research. However, the study of cheap talk is still in its infancy and the conditions in which cheap talk is effective at reducing hypothetical bias are not fully known. This study built on previous research in a number of ways. First, cheap talk was analyzed using responses obtained through a mass mail survey as opposed to an experimental setting. Second, cheap talk was analyzed in the context of a routinely used contingent valuation elicitation mechanism: the double bounded dichotomous choice technique.
Results suggest that cheap talk significantly reduced willingness-to-pay for consumers unknowledgeable about golden rice and genetic engineering. Because most consumers in the sample had little knowledge of genetic engineered and golden rice, the result also held in the aggregate. For those consumers who had heard of golden rice and were at least somewhat knowledgeable of genetic engineering, cheap talk did not reduce willingness-to-pay.
Because golden rice has yet to be commercially produced, the good was undeliverable, and a non-hypothetical treatment was not conducted. As such, we cannot definitely conclude that our cheap talk script effectively removed hypothetical bias. The ability to make such inferences depends on the extendibility and generalizability of the results in Cummings and Taylor and List (2001a) . If results in Cummings and Taylor and List (2001a) are robust, in all cases where cheap talk reduces hypothetical willingness-to-pay, hypothetical bias is eliminated.
Extending these results to our study would imply that the cheap talk script removed hypothetical bias for consumers unknowledgeable of golden rice. If the results in Cummings and Taylor and List (2001a) are not robust, our results simply imply that the cheap talk script reduces willingness-to-pay for unknowledgeable consumers, while leaving knowledgeable consumer willingness-to-pay unaffected. Although not compatible with the findings of Cummings and
Taylor, skeptics of the cheap talk method might contend that hypothetical bias did not exist to begin with and that the cheap talk script introduced a downward bias in the unknowledgeable sub-sample. It might also be argued that cheap talk reduced willingness-to-pay, but did not completely eliminate hypothetical bias. Whether cheap talk will effectively remove hypothetical bias for all goods and cases is something that can only be answered by future research where a non-hypothetical baseline exists. The current state of knowledge implies that cheap talk is an accurate tool for generating hypothetical willingness-to-pay estimates which are statistically equivalent to real willingness-to-pay, at least for subjects unknowledgeable of the good evaluated Taylor, List 2001a, List 2001b) .
In this study, cheap talk did not reduce willingness-to-pay for consumers knowledgeable of golden rice. These results imply one of two conclusions about knowledgeable consumers:
either a) hypothetical bias did not exist for this type of consumer or b) cheap talk did not remove hypothetical bias for this sub-sample of respondents. The former argument is supported by the findings of Paradiso and Antonella, who found that hypothetical bias was less severe for individuals more knowledgeable of the good evaluated. Thus, willingness-to-pay might not have declined because it did not need to -it was already similar to real willingness-to-pay. Such an argument would also be consistent with the result in Cummings and Taylor, who found that cheap talk did not lower willingness-to-pay for goods for which there was no hypothetical bias to begin with. Perhaps, consumers more knowledgeable of the good have had an opportunity to put a sufficient amount of thought into their own valuation prior to the valuation question. On the other hand, hypothetical bias may reside in willingness-to-pay estimates reported by more knowledgeable consumers even after they are confronted with a cheap talk script. That is, more knowledgeable consumers might have stated a larger willingness-to-pay in a hypothetical setting than they would have in a real valuation, and this hypothetical valuation was not adjusted downward when provided with cheap talk. This argument would be supported by the results in List (2001a) . List (2001a) found that cheap talk did not reduce willingness-to-pay for more knowledgeable, experienced consumers and as a result, hypothetical bias was still problematic for this consumer segment. Because a non-hypothetical reference point was not available in this application, we cannot confirm nor deny either hypothesis about the effect of cheap talk on more knowledgeable consumers.
Although a non-hypothetical treatment was not conducted in this study, some important conclusions can be drawn. Some have questioned whether cheap talk will be effective in a massmail survey. It has been hypothesized that, when in the comfort of their own homes, consumers might not take the time necessary to assimilate cheap talk information. What this study shows is that cheap talk can affect valuations even when an experimental monitor is not present to encourage subjects to put cognitive effort into their responses. In addition, this study not only shows that cheap talk affects valuation, but that valuations are affected in a manner consistent with previous experimental studies even though valuations were elicited by mail. So, to the extent that cheap talk has been shown to be effective in experimental settings, extendibility of this method to a broader audience through mass-mail or phone surveying appears promising.
Future research in this area might focus on investigating the relationship between knowledge level of subjects and the effectiveness of cheap talk. List (2001b) suggested that an alternative payment vehicle, used in conjunction with cheap talk, might induce more knowledgeable subjects to reduce hypothetical willingness-to-pay. Although our payment mechanism was more realistic than the auction in List (2001a) , who found a similar interaction between cheap talk and knowledge, it is perhaps less realistic than the choice experiment used in List (2001b) , who found no difference between experienced and inexperienced subjects.
Certainly more research is needed to fully understand the interactions between knowledge and experience of the subjects, payment vehicle, and cheap talk effectiveness.
Footnotes

1
Although the majority of evidence suggests hypothetical willingness-to-pay is overstated (e.g., List and Gallet) , there is also evidence to suggest that hypothetical willingness-to-pay is similar to non-hypothetical willingness-to-pay in some settings (e.g., Carlsson and Martinsson; Haab, Haung, and Whitehead).
2
Recent work by List (2001b) is one exception. In this study, a cheap talk design was administered in a mail survey (n = 1000 in each treatment).
3
Cheap talk has also been found to be effective in other experiments where subject behavior typically deviates from that predicted by economic theory. Cherry and Shogren found that cheap talk arbitrage was equally as effective as real arbitrage at reducing preference reversals and Lusk and Hudson found that offers in an ultimatum bargaining game were closer to Nash equilibrium predictions with experimenter cheap talk than without.
4
Estimating a full econometric model including demographics, we could not reject the null hypothesis of equivalent valuations across the two information treatments (p = 0.42). In addition, we tested for differences in the impact of cheap talk across informational treatments and did not find any statistically significant results. Any of these results are available from the author upon request. The response rate is relatively low compared to similar CV studies. Because of budgetary constraints, we were unable to provide monetary incentives to induce responses and the length of the survey likely hindered many potential respondents. Even with the low response rate, we were able to gather many more observations than would be possible with an experimental study with an equivalent budget constraint.
Footnotes continued
8
Objective knowledge of biotechnology was also elicited by asking three true/false questions. In the following analysis, we use subjective rather than objective knowledge levels because what someone believes they know about biotechnology is much more likely to influence their valuation and how they react to cheap talk information than how much they actually know.
None of the objective knowledge questions are significantly related to willingness-to-pay or the effect of cheap talk. These results are available from the authors upon request.
Footnotes continued
9
Cheap talk has a statistically significant effect on willingness-to-pay whether estimations include: initial dichotomous choice data only, the second dichotomous choice data only, or the pooled model shown in equation 1 and discussed throughout the paper. Although statistically significant in all specifications, the effect of cheap talk appears to be somewhat stronger in the second dichotomous choice question, likely because the second bid was closer to true willingness-to-pay for most participants.
10
In the following analysis, one could analyze the interaction between cheap talk and the Heard and NoKnowledge variables rather than constructing a single Experience variable. We have conducted the analysis both ways and very similar results are achieved with both approaches.
We choose to report the results using only the Experience variable because it simplifies the discussion. 
